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We have known since Bagehot that democracy through parliaments is about discussions 
rather then decisions. Parliaments are essential to any democracy because they question, 
scrutinize and criticize 
 
The perspective of an in-out referendum in the UK constitutes a fantastic incentive for British 
politicians and academics to conceive new ways of governing Europe. Even if their efforts of 
imagination are often remarkable, emerging propositions may constitute a threat for the 
viability of the EU in the future. A good example of this is provided by Damian Chalmers’s 
recent Policy Network paper Democratic Self-Government in Europe. It is worth looking in 
details at his proposals as they may be influential on the emerging debate on the reform of the 
governance of the EU. For instance, in a speech delivered on 31 May 2013, the UK Foreign 
Secretary, William Hague, stated: “We should think about going further still and consider a 
red card to give national parliaments the right to block legislation that need not to be agreed at 
the European level”. 
 
Chalmers proposes various measures for reinforcing national parliaments’ rights vis-à-vis the 
EU legislative procedure. Some proposals appear not to be really significant. This is the case 
for reform 1 that proposes “a stronger duty on the Union to set out in detail the added 
democratic value of a measure”. Others could have positive effects as reform 3 which enables 
national parliaments to set the legislative agenda by imposing the European Commission to 
make legislative proposals. This could indeed be a valuable input for the Commission and is 
in continuity with the so-called political dialogue established between national parliaments 
and the Commission for the last several years. Likewise, the right to petition a constitutional 
council for obtaining the disapplication of an EU law (reform 5) can be a way to enhance 
civic participation and is reminiscent of the newly adopted procedure of the European 
Citizens’ Initiative. 
 
Yet, two other, and far more crucial, proposals appear to constitute a serious threat for the 
viability of the EU as a political system producing collective, constraining and effective 
norms rather than useless and symbolic statements. Both proposals suggest that national 
parliaments should be able to block legislation, collectively at the proposal stage in one case, 
individually once EU law has been implemented in the other. 
 
First, Chalmers suggests that “unless two thirds of parliaments indicate their support for a 
measure, a Commission proposal should not go forward to the Council” with, in addition, the 
possibility to give conditional support. This proposal would reverse the existing procedure 
according to which one third of the parliaments can warn the Commission about a possible 
infringement of the subsidiarity principle. Whereas currently parliamentary silence counts as 
implicit consent, it is proposed to call for an explicit consent from no less than 18 parliaments 
in Europe. In other words, national parliaments would collectively become co-legislators of 
the EU legislative procedure, in addition to the European Parliament and the Council of the 
EU.  
 
Such a revolutionary proposal calls for several comments: 
1. National parliaments would de facto be given more influence then their respective 
governments in the legislative procedure since they would act before the Council and 
the European Parliament. As this deviates from the shared model among national 
democracies which is characterised by the domination of their executive, it means that 
in most of the member states, national governments will have the possibility to act 
twice within the legislative procedure: a priori through their parliamentary majority 
and a posteriori through the Council. What is ultimately proposed is to add something 
like a pre-reading stage to the co-decision procedure where national governments can 
try to block proposals. They are therefore offered an opportunity to circumvent the 
need to enter into dialogue with the European Commission and the European 
Parliament. 
2. As is obvious from the above paragraph, Chalmers’ proposition greatly increases the 
complexity of the decision-making process. Not only because it adds a new level to 
the already intricate legislative procedure, but because the usual institutional 
domination of the executive power over the legislature in many member states also 
makes it difficult to assess if and why a parliament will be willing to block a proposal. 
According to the type of democracies, the key actors at this stage will be the Prime 
minister, backbenchers, pivotal party groups in Parliament, coalition parties in 
government etc. 
3. The decision-making process will be far less predictable under this new procedure. As 
there is no permanent body where representatives from national parliaments meat, this 
first reading by national parliaments will inevitably be de-centralised. The protocol on 
subsidiarity of the Lisbon treaty offers a good example of such process since national 
parliaments should reach a threshold to force the Commission to justify the proposed 
legislation. The implementation of the protocol since 2009 indicates how difficult it is 
for national chambers to coordinate with each other. The aggregation of their views 
looks, in most cases, like a random game. 
4. Granting the same weight to each national parliament will mechanically benefit small 
member states by giving, for example, the House of Commons half the weight of the 
Luxembourgish Chambre des députés - not exactly in the interest of the British people. 
By contrast, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament take into account the 
size of each country either in their composition or in their decision-making rules.  
To sum up, Chalmers’s proposal of an early mandatory support by a qualified majority of 
national parliaments would result in greater domination by governments in the legislative 
process (especially governments of small member states), a greater complexity and 
unpredictability of the EU decision-making and, above all, a greater risk of blocking the 
system. To some extent, we could follow his suggestions if they were proposing less EU 
decisions in exchange of more democratic procedure. However, it is contestable whether the 
system would be genuinely more democratic as the clarity and predictability of decision-
making as well as proportional representation of the member states can also be considered 
democratic goods – and important ones. 
 
The second proposal calls for fewer comments. Chalmers suggest that “if the parliament 
judges that the costs of EU law are significant it may suspend the EU law within its territory”. 
This would be no more than the end of the primacy of EU norms on which European 
integration has been built since the very beginning. Seemingly conscious that such reform 
could damage the whole European edifice; Chalmers tries to minimize its effect. He writes 
that, in the case of the disapplication of EU law, “the European Council shall endeavour to 
secure an amicable settlement” but that “if it fails to reach [one], national law shall remain in 
place”. In other words, no legal constraint is placed on parliaments. Chalmers also states that 
few cases would ever be open as passing “anti-EU legislation” [sic] in Parliament would take 
time. This is especially doubtful since a motivated majority can act quickly in most of the 
parliaments in Europe. He finally adds that a member state would limit their use of free-riding 
for reputational reasons. This statement – which implicitly acknowledges that many 
governments would hide themselves behind their parliaments – can be questioned: Indeed, 
numerous examples of European history indicate that the diplomatic reputation of a given 
member state is of limited weight when national decision-makers face a salient domestic 
political issue. Between the country image among European diplomats and the mobilisation of 
their voters, backbenchers will not hesitate long. 
 
This second proposal would seriously damage the authority and capacity of the EU not only 
because many atomised opt-outs are to be feared but also because such a possibility 
constitutes a strong incentive for any member state not to apply EU law. The certainty of 
reciprocity was the cement of Europeanisation; break it and you destroy the EU. Here the 
analogy with the US system and the numerous possibilities to disobey federal laws appears to 
be spurious as the EU, a regional emerging system, has more to fear than an established 
federation. Moreover, the idea that national parliaments would have to protect the essential 
character of “domestic democratic values” against Brussels does not stand as long as no legal 
limits are given of those values. To take a French example, it may make sense to find a 
system where no EU law could damage the French notion of Laïcité (secularism), but once 
you have settled it, how can you prevent the French Parliament from opposing, for instance, 
the opening of the mail service or railway transport to quote a few internal market reforms 
that would certainly be regarded as a threat for national values by a majority of French MPs? 
 
To sum up, the costs of Chalmers’ proposals for the viability of the EU are obvious whereas 
its democratic benefits can be questioned – especially in a period where European institutions 
are passing less and less directives and regulations year after year. We have known since 
Bagehot that democracy through parliaments is about discussions rather then decisions. 
Parliaments are essential to any democracy because they question, scrutinize and criticize. If 
progress has to be made in the EU in that direction, granting parliaments collective or 
individual red cards will not help.  
 
The allied ingenuity about national parliaments actual role in domestic systems as well as the 
mismatch between the costs and benefits of the proposed reforms lead us to think that 
democratizing the EU is, ultimately, not the real purpose of Chalmers’ note. More surely, 
Chalmers’s aim is about finding an acceptable solution to prevent the UK from quitting the 
EU. He relevantly observes that any Western country out of the EU, even the US, is 
constrained to respect EU norms. On this basis, he concludes that it is better to remain within 
the EU with the possibility to block, suspend and disobey those norms. Taking the risk of 
breaking the EU rather than quitting it: this unsafe and rather cynical advice does not have 
much to do with genuine democratic self-government. 
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